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ORIGIN PM-07

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19

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SCI-06 INT-08 FEA-02 EB-11 AEC-11 SAJ-01 COA-02 /218 R

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TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

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CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY SANAA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170615

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, APARM, US, XO, TH
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE IOPZ

REF: A) BANGKOK 11547; B) STATE 154811; C) USUN 2224
D) STATE 140892 (NOTAL); E) STATE A-4144;
F) NEW DELHI 9569; G) TEHRAN 5975; H) BANGKOK
11623; I) BANGKOK 11379; J) STATE 19914;
K) STATE 50727; L) NEW DELHI 9807; M) COLOMBO 2083

1. AS PROMISED REF B, FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF DRAFT PAPER PRESENTED TO MFA JULY 17 (REF A).
WE HOPE THE THAI WILL CONTINUE TO TREAT MATERIAL IN PAPER
AS CONFIDENTIAL (REF H) OWING TO ITS CANDID AND SENSITIVE
NATURE. YOU SHOULD ALSO REITERATE TO THOSE THAI WHO HAVE
SEEN THE PAPER THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE NOT
NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE USG. FINALLY, AT YOUR OWN DISCRE-
TION, YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE INFORMATION BELOW AND IN
PERTINENT REFTELS IN DEALING WITH ANY MISAPPREHENSIONS THE
THAI MAY HAVE ABOUT US OBJECTIVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

2. SOVIET POSITION ON THE IOPZ - WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE
OBLIGED IOPZ PROPONENTS WITH VAGUELY ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ANY SCHEME
WHICH WOULD MATERIALLY AFFECT THEIR NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS, AND THEIR ABILITY TO PROTECT USSR SHIPPING IN
THE AREA IN TIME OF CRISIS. IN UNGA CONSIDERATION OF ZONE

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OF PEACE QUESTIONS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AMONG THOSE
OPPOSED TO THIS REGIONAL ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL
REGIME ON A PORTION OF THE HIGH SEAS, AND HAVE JOINED
OTHER MAJOR MARITIME POWERS INCLUDING THE US, UK, AND
FRANCE IN ABSTAINING ON IOPZ RESOLUTIONS. USSR HAS ALSO
EXPRESSED IRRITATION OVER FINDING ITS ACTIVITIES AND
PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN EQUATED WITH THOSE OF WESTERN
COUNTRIES IN ORIGINAL VERSION UN AD HOC COMMITTEE EXPERTS

REPORT ON GREAT POWER MILITARY ACTIVITIES (REF C). COPIES OF INR STUDIES DEALING WITH USSR AND PRC INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA ARE BEING POUCHED. IN THIS CONNECTION THE US HAS NOT ACTIVELY SOUGHT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS ON NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (SEE REF D FOR BACKGROUND).

3. THE US POSITION ON THE IOPZ-IN UNGA, USG HAS EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH OBJECTIVES OF IOPZ RESOLUTIONS BUT HAS INDICATED DOUBTS THAT THIS APPROACH WILL ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS INCLUDING LOS PROBLEMS, WITH THE CONCEPT (SEE REF E). THUS, IT IS INACCURATE TO STATE THAT THE USG IS NOT IN PRINCIPLE "IN THE LEAST" OPPOSED TO A DECLARED ZONE OF PEACE.

4. IOPZ VS. ASEAN - WHILE ANAN CITED BOTH THAI ADHERENCE TO THE IOPZ AND ASEAN PROPOSAL FOR NEUTRALIZATION OF SEA IN EXPLAINING THAI POSITION ON INDIAN OCEAN RECONNAISSANCE (REF I), WE SEE NO PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS. THE LATTER IS A POLITICAL CONCEPT FOR SOVEREIGN TERRITORIES WITH WHICH WE CAN SYMPATHIZE IN PRINCIPLE WHEREAS THE FORMER WOULD PURPORT TO IMPOSE A REGIME WHICH IN TURN COULD RESTRICT USES OF THE HIGH SEAS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHILE THE MALAYSIANS WERE THE ORIGINATORS OF THE IDEA, OTHER ASEAN MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROPOSAL GO SOMEWHAT BEYOND "PERFUNCTORY ACCOMMODATION." THEY MAY SEE IT AS PREMATURE IN LIGHT OF EXISTING CONDITIONS IN THE REGION, BUT DO REGARD IT AS A PLAUSIBLE FORMULA FOR THE FUTURE.

5. OIL - WHILE YOU ARE CORRECT THAT THE RISE IN THE PRICE OF MIDDLE EAST OIL HAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED MOST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD AND THAT ONE OF THE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE

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INDIAN OCEAN IS TO KEEP THE SEA LANES OPEN FOR PEACEFUL COMMERCE (INCLUDING COMMERCE IN OIL), THE SIZE OF RECENT OIL PRICE RISES CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO SOVIET INFLUENCE ON MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES. THE SOVIETS MAY TAKE SOME PLEASURE IN THE PROBLEMS HIGHER OIL PRICES HAVE CAUSED FOR WESTERN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES BUT THE USSR HAS LITTLE POWER TO MANIPULATE PRICES. OPEC IS CURRENTLY IN THE DRIVER'S

SEAT IN THAT REGARD AND OPEC'S MEMBERS HAVE NOT SET PRICING OR SUPPLY POLICY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PRESSURE OR INFLUENCE.

6. RIVAL GROUPINGS IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN - TEHRAN AND NEW DELHI HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED ON THE SO-CALLED EMERGENCE OF TWO RIVAL GROUPINGS IN THE WESTERN INDIAN

OCEAN (REFS G AND L). WE WOULD ONLY ADD THAT WHILE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AMONG THE TWO GROUPS CITED WHICH HAVE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ONE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWER THAN WITH THE OTHER, FOR THE MOST PART WE DO NOT SEE THAT FACT AS HAVING GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE COUNTRIES' INTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES ARE TOO DIVERSE AND COMPLEX TO EASILY ALLOW THE EMERGENCE OF A SIMPLE BIPOLAR CONSTELLATION OF CONFLICTING FORCES.

7. SRI LANKA - WE AGREE WITH ASSESSMENT OF CEYLONENE ATTITUDES CONVEYED IN REF M. IT IS TRUE CEYLONENE ARE SOMEWHAT AMBIVALENT ON INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY. ON ONE HAND THEY RETAIN BASIC CONCERN THAT GREAT POWER RIVALRIES IN INDIAN OCEAN NOT INTRUDE ON CEYLONENE INTERESTS AND SECURITY; ON OTHER HAND THEY DO NOT WISH TO SEE DEVELOPMENT OF IOPZ FRAMEWORK WHICH COULD LEAVE ONE LARGE POWER PREDOMINANT. THIS AMBIVALENCE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEAN CEYLONENE ABANDONMENT OF IOPZ PRINCIPLE.

8. INDIAN GREAT-POWER AMBITIONS - WE AGREE WITH POINTS MADE IN REF L REGARDING INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND INDIAN STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. INDIAN SUPPORT FOR THE IOPZ UNQUESTIONABLY HAS A LARGE ELEMENT OF SELF-INTEREST IN IT BUT WE DO NOT SEE INDIA, EVEN WITH A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, POSSESSING THE WHEREWITHAL TO DOMINATE

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THE INDIAN OCEAN FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. NOR IS INDIA NOW OR LIKELY TO BECOME A SURROGATE FOR SOVIET AMBITIONS. WHILE INDIAN AND SOVIET POLICIES IN ASIA FREQUENTLY ARE PARALLEL, INDIA IS HARDLY A PAWN IN SOVIET HANDS. WE THINK INDIA BASICALLY WILL FOLLOW A POLICY OF PRAGMATIC SELF-INTEREST WHICH COULD AT TIMES EVEN RUN MORE PARALLEL TO OUR INTERESTS THAN TO THOSE OF THE SOVIETS.

9. WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE IN JUSTIFYING OUR INDIAN OCEAN OBJECTIVES TO THE THAI. WE BELIEVE THAT THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE IN REFS J, K AND ENCLOSURE A TO REF E CAN BE DRAWN UPON TO GOOD EFFECT IN ARGUING OUR CASE. KISSINGER

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